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Abstract In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the
epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ rationality is evaluated
in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find
that different strategies—in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one
based on the Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of
the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the
Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We
tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We
argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this
fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to show that the problem of peer disagreement can be
analyzed from a game-theoretic perspective. The problem of peer disagreement, as
it is presented in the literature (e.g., Kelly 2005, 167; Christensen 2009, 756; Elga
2007, 478; Feldman 2007, 201), is how to respond rationally to the disagreement
from an epistemic peer, whereby epistemic peer is construed as an agent who has
the same evidence and is comparably good at evaluating that evidence (Kelly 2005,
170; Christensen 2007, 188; Feldman 2007, 201; Lackey 2008, 274). Game theory,
in turn, is the study of strategic decision making, where ‘strategic’ means that the
decision of one decision maker may interact with that of another. This paper
explains how the latter can be used to analyze the former.
To do so, we focus on two prominent strategies recommended in the literature
about peer disagreement, namely the response advocated by the Conciliatory View
and the one suggested by the Steadfast View.1 On the Conciliatory View, it can not
be rational for an agent to stick to her opinion when it is disputed by an epistemic
peer. Instead, she should suspend judgment (Feldman 2007), split the difference
(Elga 2007), or at least migrate her opinion significantly in the direction of her
peer’s conflicting opinion (Christensen 2007). In this paper we focus on full belief
states rather than degrees of belief, so that the subtle differences between these
‘Conciliatory Views’ can be dispensed with. According to the Steadfast View, on
the other hand, it can be rational for an agent to retain her opinion in the face of peer
disagreement (Kelly 2005; van Inwagen 2010).
The game-theoretic toolkit enables us to analyze the rationality of these responses
(strategies) for disagreeing peers (players), relative to these peers’ epistemic goals
(preferences). In the literature on peer disagreement, the epistemic goal is commonly
understood to be believing the correct truth-value of the proposition under discussion
(Christensen 2007, 216; Feldman 2007, 212; Elga 2007, 488; Kelly 2010, 17; and,
even if only indirectly, White 2005, 450). Thus, the rationality of the available
responses—i.e., the Conciliatory strategy and the Steadfast strategy—can be analyzed
by investigating to what extent they satisfy the preferences (epistemic goals) of the
disagreeing peers. In Sect. 2 we argue that existing formal approaches do not address
this particular question. In Sects. 3 and 4 we explain the details of our approach to the
problem of peer disagreement. Section 5 discusses the results of this model, Sect. 6
considers some possible extensions or variations of the model, and Sect. 7 wraps up by
emphasizing some key take-aways.
2 Why a Game-Theoretic Approach?
Why should a game-theoretic analysis be a relevant contribution to the debate about
peer disagreement? Our motivation is that the resources of game theory enable a
clarification of the responses to peer disagreement—in particular, of the
1 In the debate about peer disagreement, it is common to talk about ‘responses’, whereas in the context of
game theory ‘strategies’ is conventional. In this paper, we will use the two terms interchangeably.
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Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View—along an independently motivated and
well-developed standard. In the debate about peer disagreement, it is not always
clear how exactly rationality is understood, what exactly counts as a peer, what a
disagreement is, or even what exactly the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View
amount to (cf. Jehle and Fitelson 2009; Moss 2011; Lasonen-Aarnio 2013).
A formalization along the lines of game theory forces us to be precise about these
notions. And the fruit of such explicitness is that it helps us to gain a better
understanding of the conditions under which a particular strategy (like the ones
suggested by the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View) can be considered a
rational response to the disagreement from a peer.
We do not want to suggest that our game-theoretic model is the only way to make
the machinery under the problem of peer disagreement formally precise. Here we
consider some previous work along these lines.
First it is important to distinguish quantitative and qualitative cases of peer
disagreement. In the quantitative case the agents assign different degrees of belief to
a proposition, whereas the qualitative case concerns full belief states (belief,
disbelief, and suspension of judgment). Some have argued that the quantitative
model of epistemic agents should be taken as basic and the qualitative model should
be reduced to it (Lin and Kelly 2012; Leitgeb 2014). Others have argued the reverse
(Easwaran forthcoming). This debate remains unresolved. As a result, we can treat
quantitative and qualitative cases of peer disagreement as separate problems. Our
focus in this paper is on the qualitative case. But as the majority of the work in
formal epistemology that is potentially relevant to peer disagreement focuses on the
quantitative case, we discuss this work first.
There are two dominant models in the literature on revising degrees of belief in
light of new information (here, the information that an epistemic peer assigns
different degrees of belief). One is the (iterated) linear pooling model developed by
French (1956), DeGroot (1974) and Lehrer and Wagner (1981). In this model, the
revised degrees of belief are obtained by taking a weighted average of the agents’
opinions. This is consistent with both the Steadfast View and the Conciliatory View.
The Steadfast View says an agent can rationally give weight one to her own opinion
and zero to her peer’s, whereas the Conciliatory View says this is not rationally
permissible.2
However, it is not clear what gives linear pooling its normative force. Without an
interpretation of the weights used, ‘‘it is not clear why we should change our beliefs
according to the weighted linear average, instead of, for instance, the weighted
geometric average’’ (Martini et al. 2013, 887).
Romeijn (2015) attempts to give such an interpretation. He shows that if the
agents’ priors take a particular form, linear pooling can be construed as a special
case of Bayesian conditionalization (the other dominant model for revising degrees
of belief), where the weights assigned to agents are identified with the truth-
conduciveness of those agents. On this construal, linear pooling inherits the
2 On this explication of the views French and DeGroot are proponents of the Steadfast View, and Lehrer
and Wagner are proponents of the Conciliatory View. However, Lehrer and Wagner would not endorse
stronger interpretations of the Conciliatory View, e.g., that giving equal weight to each agent’s opinion is
required (cf. Jehle and Fitelson 2009).
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normative force that Bayesian conditionalization is generally taken to have,
although particular assumptions need to be in place in order for linear pooling to be
sanctioned by the Bayesian model.
Two problems remain. First, there appears to be no normative reason for the
agents’ priors to take the required form. Second, it does not settle the debate
between the Steadfast and the Conciliatory View, as the formalism itself does not
settle whether an agent is rationally permitted to give weight one to her own
opinion.
The first problem can be circumvented by allowing the agents to have any priors,
taking Bayesian conditionalization as the normative model for revising degrees of
belief without requiring that it agrees with linear pooling. Under certain
assumptions, the agents can be guaranteed to reach a consensus in this model
(Aumann 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1982). But the second problem
remains.3
It appears, then, that none of the extant work in formal epistemology yields a
view on the quantitative case of peer disagreement, although a focused discussion of
the relations between the models we discussed and peer disagreement may still yield
valuable insight. While we offer no view on the quantitative case here, the model we
present could relatively easily be adapted to it.
In addition to the problems mentioned above, linear pooling and Bayesian
conditionalization offer no solution to the qualitative case of peer disagreement,
which will be our focus from here on out. For the qualitative case there are again
two dominant classes of relevant formal models. The first is known as belief
revision, usually (but not necessarily) using the so-called AGM model (Alchourro´n
et al. 1985). This model has been applied to peer disagreement (Cevolani 2014;
Elkin 2015). While these papers are interesting, they beg the question in favor of the
Conciliatory View: they explore ways in which a Conciliatory response to peer
disagreement affects an agent’s other beliefs.
A similar problem holds for the second class of models, those based on judgment
aggregation. Regardless of whether one follows the dominant axiomatic approach
(List and Pettit 2002; List 2013) or focuses more directly on the reliability of
aggregation methods (Hartmann et al. 2010; Hartmann and Sprenger 2012), these
models already assume that one has decided to form a consensus opinion. Again, the
Steadfast View is ruled out by the formal setup without argument.
It is also worth noting that most models of judgment aggregation and voting
theory more generally concentrate on the case of at least three agents, whereas we,
following the peer disagreement literature, focus on the case of two agents. Most of
the prominent aggregation methods rely on some variation of majority voting,
3 Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982, 197) show that one of the agents’ opinion may never change
despite the presence of disagreement. This suggests that sticking to one’s opinion is (sometimes)
rationally permissible, in support of the Steadfast View. But this argument works only if one assumes that
Bayesian conditionalization is the only requirement of diachronic rationality, since further requirements
of rationality may rule out these cases. Moreover, the kind of cases considered by Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis arguably do not count as cases of peer disagreement strictly speaking, as the agents have
different evidence concerning the proposition they disagree about.
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which does not yield very interesting results in the case of two disagreeing agents.
We briefly return to the case of more than two agents in Sect. 6.
The model of the present paper addresses the peer disagreement debate head on,
as we give a direct comparison of the Conciliatory and the Steadfast View. While
some previous work has aimed to make ideas from the peer disagreement literature
formally precise (Jehle and Fitelson 2009; Cevolani 2014; Elkin 2015), we are not
aware of any formal work that makes this kind of direct comparison.4 Some of the
work mentioned above could perhaps be adapted to make such a comparison, which
we think would be very interesting. But in the remainder of this paper we aim to
argue (1) that the specific game-theoretic model we provide captures one interesting
way to make the ideas underlying the peer disagreement debate more precise, and
(2) that the model is flexible enough that it can be straightforwardly adapted to
capture other ways of making these ideas more precise.
3 The Peer Disagreement Game
We introduce our game-theoretic setup with the help of an informal example.
Imagine two detectives, call them Jane (Marple) and Hercule (Poirot), who both
have been asked to go to a crime scene to investigate whether /, say, whether the
butler is the culprit. We make the following three assumptions about the detectives.
First, they have the same evidence at their disposal to investigate /, namely
whatever traces are left at the crime scene. Second, the detectives can make an
informed estimation of how reliable each of them is in investigating /, based on
their respective track-records; the number of crimes they have solved in the past
compared to the number of crimes they did not solve. Third, the detectives really
want to find out the truth regarding /, they really want to solve the case.
We take it that the fulfillment of these three conditions is what is (at minimum)
required for the two detectives to be called each other’s peers, considering the
construals of peerhood by, for example, Kelly (2005, 175), Elga (2007, 484),
Lackey (2008, 274) and Christensen (2009, 757). The attribution of peerhood then
depends on how equal the detectives must be in their reliability. Our analysis
accommodates this.
Jane and Hercule both go to the crime scene, and spend some time examining and
evaluating the evidence. After some time, they meet up to report their findings.
Two things can happen at this point. Jane and Hercule have either formed the
same belief about /, or they have formed conflicting beliefs and disagree about /.
In the model, these beliefs are generated probabilistically (see the next section).
If the detectives have reached the same conclusion about /, say, they agree that
the butler is indeed the culprit, then there is no problem of peer disagreement. The
detectives can go write their reports. The case that we are interested in is when the
detectives have formed conflicting opinions regarding /; for example, when Jane
4 Except perhaps Lehrer and Wagner (1981), as they argue for normative claims which entail that agents
should give positive weight to their peers. This is effectively an argument for the Conciliatory View in the
quantitative case (at least on liberal interpretations of that view, see footnote 2). But note the criticism by
Martini et al. (2013) mentioned above.
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believes that the butler is the culprit and Hercule believes that the butler is innocent.
And our question is what, in such a case, a rational response for Jane and Hercule
can be, given their goal of finding out the truth about /, and the information they
have about each other’s track-records.
Based on the debate about peer disagreement, we distinguish three strategies that
the detectives can choose. The first comes from the Steadfast View and is the
strategy of staying with the initial belief. We call this strategy Stay. The second
strategy is the Conciliatory View’s recommendation to suspend judgment.5 This
strategy is called Suspend. And third, for the sake of completeness, we include
switching to the belief of the other detective as a third possible strategy, called
Switch.
After Jane and Hercule find out that they disagree about whether the butler is the
culprit, they each play one of these three strategies. When Jane plays Suspend, she
withdraws her initial belief about /, goes back to the crime scene to re-examine the
evidence, and forms a new belief about /. But when Jane plays Stay, she chooses
to ignore the disagreement and maintains her initial opinion. And when Jane plays
Switch, she chooses to ignore her own opinion and takes over the belief of
Hercule.
So only when a detective plays Suspend she gets a chance to form a new
opinion. It might be objected that acquiring a new belief is not a necessary
consequence of suspending judgment. We agree. We should distinguish between
two ways in which judgment can be suspended. The first is to suspend judgment
indefinitely, or at least until new evidence comes in, because there is at present not
enough evidence to form a rational belief. The second is to suspend judgment only
momentarily, as an act of caution in light of unexpected counterevidence, but after
which a new belief may be formed through a re-examination of the evidence. Such a
momentary suspension of judgment is justified for cases in which a Peircean
‘irritation of doubt’ needs to be resolved, because it is unsatisfactory or unwarranted
not to have a belief about the matter. We take it that this is the preferred form of
suspension of judgment in the well-known restaurant case of Christensen (2007,
193), in which two peers disagree about the division of the bill, as well as in other
influential examples of peer disagreement (e.g. Feldman 2007, 208–209). In this
paper we also work with this short-term interpretation of suspension of judgment. A
long-term interpretation would be a welcome extension of our analysis (see Sect. 6
and Appendix 2).
The disagreement game ends when the two detectives reach an agreement about
/. For example, suppose Jane believes that the butler did it, and Hercule believes
that he did not do it, and Jane plays Suspend and Hercule plays Stay. Then the
game ends when, after re-examining the evidence, Jane draws the same conclusion
5 Technically, the recommendation from the Conciliatory View can also be to split the difference with
one’s peer (Elga 2007), or to revise one’s initial confidence level in the proposition considerably
(Christensen 2007). But since we restrict ourselves to full beliefs, we take it that the Conciliatory View’s
recommendation amounts to suspending judgment.
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as Hercule, namely that the butler is innocent.6 The same would happen when, for
example, Jane plays Stay and Hercule plays Switch. But the game continues
when, after one or both of them re-examine the evidence, the two detectives still
disagree about /.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that the detectives do not change
strategies throughout the disagreement game.7 This means that the game might also
continue forever. For example, when Jane believes that the butler is innocent and
Hercule disagrees, and both detectives play Stay, then they will never come to an
agreement. The same thing happens when both detectives play Switch.8
And now we are in a position to analyze how well these strategies do in guiding
each detective to the correct verdict on whether the butler did it. Which of these
strategies gives a detective the best prospects of arriving at the truth?
Observe that which strategy is best will depend on two factors.9 First, it depends
on the reliability (i.e., the track-record) of each of the two detectives. For example,
if Jane thinks that Hercule is better at evaluating correctly whether the butler did it,
then it would be ill-advised for her to play Stay upon finding out that Hercule
disagrees with her initial assessment. But when Jane thinks that she is more reliable
than Hercule, then playing Stay may be sensible.
Second, which strategy is best depends also on the strategy of the other detective.
For example, when Hercule plays Stay, it does not really matter for Jane whether
she plays Suspend or Switch, because either way the game will end when Jane
takes over the conclusion of Hercule. But when Hercule plays Switch, it does
matter whether Jane plays Suspend or Switch, because playing Switch will
bring them in a state of perpetual disagreement, whereas playing Suspend will
make them agree eventually (due to the probabilistic way in which new beliefs are
generated; see the next section). We will return to these points in Sect. 5.
This concludes our informal description of the peer disagreement game. In the
next section we will provide the formal vocabulary, and then analyze this game.
6 Since Hercule plays Stay, he never changes his belief. So the game ends when Jane concedes. As we
explain in more detail in Sect. 4, our probabilistic model for generating new beliefs guarantees that this
will happen eventually when she plays Suspend.
7 The reason is that this allows a straightforward comparison of the Conciliatory View, which
recommends playing Suspend for all instances of peer disagreement, and the Steadfast View, according
to which playing Stay can be rational. It would be an interesting extension of our model to allow players
to change their strategy during the game (see Sect. 6).
8 That under these strategies the game continues forever does not make an evaluation of the rationality of
these strategies impossible. For in both cases we can still evaluate how well these strategies do with
respect to tracking the truth.
9 It should be noted that on our approach the rationality of a strategy does not depend in any way on
‘right reasoning’ at the first stage, during the initial assessment of the evidence, like it does in Kelly
(2005, 2010). Our approach is more akin to Christensen (2007) or Elga (2007), where a rational strategy is
to be determined independent of one’s initial reasoning behind the disputed belief.
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4 Rationality for Jane and Hercule
Whenever Jane and Hercule investigate the evidence, they may conclude that the
butler did it (/) or that he did not do it (:/). One of these conclusions is true and
one is false.
We will denote by p and q the reliability or truth-sensitivity of Jane and Hercule,
respectively. Thus p is the probability, on any given investigation, that Jane draws a
true conclusion from the evidence. 1 p denotes the probability of a false belief. So
if the butler really did it Jane believes that he did it with probability p and believes
in his innocence with probability 1 p. Whereas if he is innocent she believes in his
innocence with probability p and believes that he did it with probability 1 p.
Hercule’s probabilities of drawing a true or a false conclusion from the evidence are
denoted by q and 1 q, respectively.
We choose to model the probability of generating a true or false belief rather than
the probability of generating a belief for or against / because we have evidence for
the former but not the latter based on the respective track-records of the two
detectives. We assumed at the start of Sect. 3 that this track-record information is
known to the two detectives.
To avoid trivial cases, we assume that 0\p\1 and 0\q\1. We further assume
that, if Jane or Hercule suspends judgment in response to disagreement, their new
opinion is generated with the same probabilities as their initial opinion (so Jane
believes correctly with probability p, and Hercule believes correctly with
probability q). We also assume that each time an opinion is generated this is done
independently (in the probabilistic sense) from the detective’s previous opinions and
the other detective’s current or previous opinions.
We think the assumption that the detectives reason independently from each
other is justified because they make their assessments separately. If they are likely to
come to the same conclusion this must be because the evidence points in a particular
direction, which is reflected in the model by the choice of p and q.10 On the other
hand, the assumption that newly generated opinions are independent from
previously generated ones may be unrealistic, but it turns out not to have a strong
influence on the results (see Sect. 6 and Appendix 1).
In the epistemology of peer disagreement—as we learn from, for example,
Christensen (2007, 216), Feldman (2007, 212), Elga (2007, 488), and Kelly (2010,
17)—the objective of rational conduct is commonly understood to be believing the
correct truth-value. This suggests the following epistemic norm.
10 Note that p and q reflect the detectives’ probabilities of reasoning correctly given the evidence, but not
the probability of certain evidence being present; its presence or absence is taken as given for our
purposes.
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Accuracy Norm (AN) Having a true belief is more valuable than having a false
belief.
We assume that Jane and Hercule share this noble goal, and that in fact obtaining
a true belief about whether the butler did it is their only goal.11 So the two detectives
are not distracted by pragmatic concerns. This is a methodological rather than a
substantive assumption: we are interested in the epistemology of peer disagreement,
not its pragmatics.
(AN) determines the detectives’ preferences over outcomes of the disagreement
game: Jane prefers an outcome in which she has a true belief about the butler’s guilt
over one in which she has a false belief, and likewise for Hercule.12 A detective
receives utility 1 if her belief about the guilt or innocence of the butler at the end of
the disagreement game is true, and utility 0 if it is false.13
The expected utility of a detective in the game is then simply the probability of
ending the game with a true belief. So Jane and Hercule prefer a strategy if it
increases their probability of ending the disagreement game with a true belief
concerning /.
We can now determine the probabilities of ending the disagreement game with a
true belief for each combination of strategies of the two detectives (a combination of
strategies is called a strategy profile).
If both detectives play Stay, they never change their mind in response to
disagreement, so their probability of ending with a true belief is simply the
probability that they obtain a true belief initially: p for Jane and q for Hercule. In all
other cases the probability of ending the disagreement game with a true belief is the
same for both detectives. These probabilities are indicated in Table 1. The rows of
Table 1 indicate Jane’s choice of strategy, and the columns indicate Hercule’s
choice.14
How can the detectives maximize their probability of ending the disagreement
game with a true belief, given that the choice of strategy of the other detective
11 We recognize that one might have other epistemic goals than truth. In Sect. 5 we show that some of
these goals can be seen to follow from (AN). In Sect. 6 we discuss the possibility of explicitly adding
other norms.
12 Note that under our interpretation of (AN) detectives care only about the truth of their own belief.
Results concerning a variation of our model where the detectives also care about the truth of the other
detective’s belief are available from the authors upon request.
13 The introduction of utilities here adds nothing over and above the informal statement in the previous
sentence. In particular the numbers 0 and 1 are arbitrary: all that matters is that a true belief yields a
higher utility.
14 This completes our specification of the game. Formally, a game is a triple ðN; fSigi2N ; fuigi2NÞ, where
N is the set of players, Si the set of strategies available to player i, and ui the utility function for player i,
which assigns real-valued utility to each strategy profile. In our case there are two players:
N ¼ fJane; Herculeg; the strategy sets for both players are identical: SJane ¼ SHercule ¼
fStay; Suspend; Switchg; and the utility for each player on each strategy profile is as in Table 1.
The utilities are determined using the description of the disagreement game given in Sect. 3. For
example, if both detectives play Suspend they will generate new beliefs repeatedly until the first time
they agree. The probability that they both generate a belief that / is true is pq and the probability that they
agree that / is false is ð1 pÞð1 qÞ. So the probability that they end the game with a correct belief
about / is the probability that, on the first round on which they agree, they agree that / is true rather than
that / is false. This probability is simply pq divided by pqþ ð1 pÞð1 qÞ. See also Appendix 1.
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influences their probability of attaining true belief, but they cannot control it? Game
theorists have invented various concepts of rationality in a game to deal with this
problem. We will use the notion of Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium is a profile—that is, an assignment of a strategy to each
player—in which either player’s strategy is a best response to the other’s. In other
words, in a Nash equilibrium, no player can get an outcome she prefers over the
equilibrium outcome by unilaterally changing her strategy. In our game this means
that in a Nash equilibrium Jane and Hercule are maximizing their respective
probabilities of ending the game with a true belief, given (that is, keeping fixed) the
other detective’s strategy. This is how we interpret (epistemic) rationality for Jane
and Hercule.
5 Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of this game?15 This turns out to depend on the values
of p and q. Figure 1 shows which strategy profiles are Nash equilibria for any
combination of values of p and q.
Recall that we noted in Sect. 3 that two factors would influence which strategy
choice is best. First, the truth-sensitivity of the two detectives (modeled as p and q)
and second, the strategy of the other detective. Both of these factors are shown in
our results in Fig. 1.
The truth-sensitivity of the detectives clearly influences which strategy profiles
are rational. For example, (Stay,Switch) is a Nash equilibrium whenever
Hercule’s truth-sensitivity (his probability of drawing a true conclusion) is less than
Jane’s truth-sensitivity and less than Jane’s probability of drawing a false
conclusion (formally, q minfp; 1 pg). Similarly, (Switch,Stay) is a Nash
equilibrium whenever Hercule’s truth-sensitivity is between Jane’s truth-sensitivity
and Jane’s probability of drawing a false conclusion (formally, p q 1 p).
The other detective’s strategy also influences what it is rational for a detective to
do. For example, if Hercule’s truth-sensitivity is higher than Jane’s probability of
drawing a false conclusion, but less than one-half (formally, 1 p q 1=2), the
Nash equilibria are (Stay,Suspend) and (Suspend,Switch). So under these
circumstances, if Hercule chooses the strategy Suspend, it is rational for Jane to
choose Stay, while if Hercule chooses Switch, it is rational for Jane to choose
Suspend.
Table 1 Expected utilities
associated with each strategy
profile under (AN)
Stay Suspend Switch
Stay (p, q) p p
Suspend q pq
pqþð1pÞð1qÞ pð1ð1pÞð1qÞÞ1pð1pÞ
Switch q qð1ð1pÞð1qÞÞ
1qð1qÞ pq
15 We consider only pure strategy equilibria.
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The epistemic success of the two detectives (both in terms of which strategy
promises the best probability of a true belief, and in terms of the value of that
probability) thus depends on the choices made by the other detective. In this way the
epistemology of this model is truly social.
One way to understand the results in Fig. 1 is to view the detectives as making a
tradeoff between two competing risks. On the one hand, there is the ‘cost’ of giving
up one’s initial opinion. On the other hand, there is the cost of ignoring the other
detective. When one detective has a significantly better track-record than the other
(as reflected in the values of p and q), it is too costly for that detective to give up her
initial opinion and switch to the other’s opinion. She gains more by staying with the
initial belief, or suspending judgment and acquiring a new belief.
For the other detective it is the other way around. In her case, it is too costly to
ignore the opinion of the other detective. Since she does not have as good a track-
record, she would not gain as much by staying with her initial belief, or suspending
judgment and acquiring a new belief, as she will by switching to the opinion of the
other detective. For her the cost of ignoring the other detective is higher than the
cost of giving up her original opinion. The tipping points in these game-theoretic
transactions can be read off from Fig. 1.
It is worth pointing out that the detectives’ desire to minimize these risks is not
epistemically basic. We have assumed that the only thing the detectives (ultimately)
care about is maximizing their probability of ending the peer disagreement game
with a true belief about /. We now see that this goal, as formalized in (AN), implies
that the detectives should worry about these two risks, and gives the detectives an
epistemically motivated basis for trading them off against one another. In this sense
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Stay,Switch)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Suspend)
(Switch,Suspend)
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Suspend)
(Stay,Stay)
0
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Fig. 1 Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game as a function of the truth-sensitivity of the
detectives. E.g., if p ¼ 0:4 and q ¼ 0:9 then the Nash equilibria of the game are (Suspend,Stay) and
(Switch,Suspend)
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our results fit nicely with the emerging literature that aims to explain various
epistemic norms as following from (AN) (Joyce 1998; Pettigrew 2013).
Of particular interest in evaluating the results in Fig. 1 are the profiles
(Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend). This is because the former captures
most directly the Steadfast View—according to which it can be rational to Stay in
a case of peer disagreement—and the latter captures most directly the Conciliatory
View—according to which the only rational option is to Suspend.
What is surprising, and running contra the peer disagreement literature, is that
both (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) turn out to constitute Nash
equilibria, under some conditions even both at once.
As we can see from Fig. 1, the Steadfast profile (Stay,Stay) is a Nash
equilibrium when Jane and Hercule are each other’s equals in terms of how truth-
sensitive their beliefs are (i.e., p ¼ q). In such a case neither would gain anything by
playing Suspend or Switch (provided the other detective continues to play
Stay). This is because the probability that a detective ends up with a true belief by
staying with her initial opinion is just as high as the probability that the opinion of
the other detective or a newly generated opinion is true.
However, a mutual Conciliatory approach, as expressed in the strategy profile
(Suspend,Suspend), can also be a Nash equilibrium. This happens when p and
q are both greater than one-half and are relatively close to each other (see Fig. 1).16
When both detectives have relatively good track-records, and they find out that they
have formed conflicting beliefs, they stand to gain more when they both suspend
judgment and acquire a new belief, than when they stick to their initial beliefs, or
switch to the other detective’s belief.
An especially interesting scenario occurs whenever p and q are exactly equal and
greater than one-half: then (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are Nash
equilibria at the same time. Under the definition of rationality we use, in such a case
both Steadfast and Conciliatory strategies are rational.
We wish to stress the significance of this result. In the literature on peer
disagreement, the Steadfast strategy and the Conciliatory strategy are typically
presented as mutually exclusive; either it is rational to play Stay or it is rational to
play Suspend, but they cannot both be rational. A surprising insight of our
analysis is that this need not be accurate. Under certain conditions, namely when
two agents are positively and equally reliable, both the Steadfast strategy and the
Conciliatory strategy can be rational. Moreover, the case where the two agents are
positively and equally reliable is exactly the case the peer disagreement literature
has focused on.
So where does this leave us in the peer disagreement debate? If we take seriously
the modalities in the definitions of the views, the Steadfast View ‘wins’: it can be
rational to stick to one’s opinion in the face of peer disagreement; the Conciliatory
View’s claim that this cannot be rational is false in our model. But if we take the
views as recommending strategies (Stay for the Steadfast View and Suspend for
16 More precisely, the region where (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash equilibrium is characterized by the
inequality
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pð1pÞ
p
2p1  q p
2
12pð1pÞ (although the first expression is undefined when p ¼ 1=2, the point
p ¼ q ¼ 1=2 is also part of this region).
1356 R. Heesen, P. van der Kolk
123
the Conciliatory View) then we think the Conciliatory View has the advantage—
even when both are Nash equilibria—for the following reasons.
First, whenever (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are Nash equilibria
simultaneously, (Suspend,Suspend) offers a higher utility (a higher probability
of solving the case correctly) to both detectives.17 In fact, (Suspend,Suspend) is
Pareto efficient. So Jane and Hercule prefer to play (Suspend,Suspend) over
(Stay,Stay). If they are allowed to discuss their strategy before the game starts,
we should expect both detectives to play Suspend.
Second, Suspend is a weakly dominant strategy (for both detectives), while
Stay is not. This means that playing Suspend pays off at least as well as playing
Stay or Switch, regardless of what strategy the other detective chooses. So in
this situation, playing Stay is only best for a detective who is absolutely certain
that the other detective is playing Stay as well (and even then playing Suspend is
equally good), whereas if there is only the slightest uncertainty about what the other
detective is going to do, Suspend is the uniquely best strategy.
Third, we can see in Fig. 1 that when p and q are both greater than one-half there
is a significant area in which the profile (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash
equilibrium, while (Stay,Stay) is a Nash equilibrium only when p and q are
exactly equal.18 This means that the strategy Suspend has a larger margin for error
than the strategy Stay. If Jane and Hercule lack precise information about each
other’s truth-sensitivity (as is reasonable to expect), playing Stay is ‘riskier’ than
playing Suspend because the former requires exact and the latter only
approximate equality of the detectives’ truth-sensitivities.
To sum up, a surprising result of this model is that if the detectives have equal
track-records, and these track-records are ‘good’ (better than chance), then both the
Steadfast profile and the Conciliatory profile are Nash equilibria. However, we have
noted three reasons to think that in such cases the Conciliatory strategy should be
preferred.
6 Limitations and Extensions of Our Analysis
We have limited our analysis to a particular game-theoretic formalization of a
particular disagreement game between two detectives, Jane and Hercule. To what
extent does our analysis generalize to other peer disagreements? And what
variations or extensions of our formalization are possible?
Regarding the first question, our analysis applies to peer disagreements in general
insofar as they satisfy the assumptions of our model. In particular, (1) peers are
cashed out in terms of comparable reliability or truth-sensitivity, (2) the possible
responses available to the peers are something like the strategies Stay, Suspend,
and Switch as we model them, and (3) the rationality of a particular response is
evaluated in terms of how well it tracks the truth.
17 Whenever p ¼ q[ 1=2, it must also be the case that p2
p2þð1pÞ2 [ p.
18 More formally, the area where (Stay,Stay) is an equilibrium is measure zero in the parameter space,
whereas the area where (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium has positive measure.
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Regarding the second question, there are many options for different peer
disagreement games. Let us give eight variables that can be filled in differently.
First, doxastic attitudes: in our model, strategies act on full belief states, but
strategies might also be interpreted as adjusting degrees of belief.
Second, we forced our detectives to generate a new belief whenever they suspend
judgment on /. A variation of our model might allow peers to persist in a state of
suspension. This outcome could be assigned its own value, presumably worse than
having a true belief but better than having a false belief. We consider this variation
in Appendix 2. Unsurprisingly, the results depend on what epistemic value is
assigned to the state of suspension.
Third, we assumed that whenever Jane or Hercule generates a new belief (i.e., at
the end of a round on which they disagreed and the relevant detective is playing
Suspend) the new belief generated is probabilistically independent of the belief
held on the previous round. This may seem unrealistic. For example, Jane may
generally be a reliable detective (p[ 1=2) but she may be prone to repeat mistakes
in her reasoning. In Appendix 1 we consider a version of the model in which newly
generated beliefs are positively correlated with the belief held on the previous
round. The results are qualitatively similar to those of Sect. 5.
Fourth, the number of peers. What happens if there are more than two
disagreeing peers? Consider the case that we focused on above, where the peers’
truth-sensitivity is equal, and better than chance. The Condorcet Jury Theo-
rem shows that if a moderately large number of peers simultaneously state their
opinion, the majority opinion is highly likely to be correct.19 But models of
informational cascades show that if the peers state their opinion sequentially, the
majority outcome is not nearly so informative (Bikhchandani et al. 1992, 996–999).
This illustrates once again that the success of epistemic strategies—here majority
voting, a plausible generalization of the Conciliatory View—can be quite sensitive
to subtle contextual details, which formal models can focus attention on.
Fifth, we kept the peers’ strategies fixed throughout the game. The reason for this
was to enable an evaluation of the Conciliatory and Steadfast strategies. But it
would be an interesting extension of the game to allow peers to change their
strategies during the game.
Sixth, we assumed that the game might go on indefinitely. This is not very realistic.
In real life there are time and energy constraints. So another possible extension would
be to let the game continue for a limited number of rounds, after which the agents must
have made up their minds. We consider the case with only one round in Appendix 2. If
the other assumptions are unchanged, the results favor the Conciliatory View slightly
more than those of the main text (see Fig. 3 in Appendix 2).
Seventh, in our analysis the rationality of a strategy was evaluated using Nash
equilibria. Although this is very natural in game theory, it has substantive normative
implications. So one may want to consider alternatives. Available alternatives
include various refinements of the notion of equilibrium, such as the trembling hand
equilibrium, and alternative standards, such as weak dominance. Different strategies
may turn out to be rational under such different standards of rationality.
19 See List and Goodin (2001) for philosophical discussion and generalizations of the theorem.
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Finally, we worked with only one epistemic norm, namely accuracy. But there
are more epistemic goals. For example, many philosophers of science have argued,
under the label of ‘epistemic diversity’, that maintaining diversity of opinion can
have epistemic value to a population of scientists, stimulating new ideas and
discoveries (Feyerabend 1975; Kitcher 1990; Zollman 2010). And the literature on
epistemic rationality has identified a trade-off between truth and information (Levi
1967). For example, true beliefs could be maximized by believing only tautologies,
but this is not informative. Either of these considerations could motivate
augmenting or replacing (AN) with different norms.
7 Conclusion
By way of conclusion we emphasize four lessons that can be drawn from our
preliminary game-theoretic investigation of the epistemology of peer disagreement.
First, in our model the Steadfast and Conciliatory strategies were sometimes both
right: there were circumstances in which both staying with your own opinion and
suspending belief were rational. The idea that staying and suspending can be
rational simultaneously is underexplored in the literature and worth investigating
more extensively.
Second, the rationality of a response to peer disagreement may depend on the
truth-sensitivity of the peers. Both the peers’ relative truth-sensitivity (who has a
better track-record and by how much?) and their absolute truth-sensitivity (are they
better than chance, say, or some other objective threshold?) can make a difference.
Third, what is rational for a peer to do (e.g., whether to be Steadfast or
Conciliatory) may depend on what the other peer is doing. This is a natural
conclusion to draw in the game-theoretic context, but underexplored in the peer
disagreement literature.
Fourth, analysis of other game-theoretic models of peer disagreement may shed
more light on the above three points and other important questions about peer
disagreement. We encourage anyone interested in our model (especially if they
liked it but for one or two assumptions) to develop and analyze such an alternative
game-theoretic model of peer disagreement. We hope to have provided a fruitful
framework within with such further models can be developed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: A Model With Correlated Beliefs
In the main text we made a number of assumptions, some of which it might be
desirable to relax or drop. In these appendices we consider a few slightly different
versions of the model. In Appendix 1 we relax the assumption that, when a detective
plays Suspend, the new beliefs generated when a disagreement occurs are
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probabilistically independent of those generated on the previous round. In Appendix
2, we consider a non-iterative version of the game (i.e., the detectives’ beliefs are
evaluated at the end of the first round, rather than after a potentially lengthy
exchange).
The Model
In the main text we assumed that whenever Jane or Hercule generates a new belief
(i.e., at the end of a round on which they disagreed and the relevant detective is
playing Suspend) the new belief generated is probabilistically independent of the
belief held on the previous round. This may seem unrealistic. For example, Jane
may generally be a reliable detective (p[ 1=2) but she may be prone to repeat
mistakes in her reasoning.
Here is a way to generalize the model to account for this possibility, while
retaining the detectives’ truth-sensitivity as a parameter of the model. Whenever a
new belief needs to be generated (on a round other than the first), Jane retains the
belief she had on the previous round with probability 1 d, and she only generates
a new belief with probability d. If she generates a new belief, the new belief is true
with probability p and false with probability 1 p.20
As a result, Jane’s newly generated opinion is positively correlated with her
opinion on the previous round, with lower values of d corresponding to higher
degrees of correlation. Similarly for Hercule: he keeps the belief he had on the
previous round with probability 1 e, and if he does generate a new belief it is true
with probability q.
When d ¼ e ¼ 1 this model reduces to the model of the main text in which newly
generated beliefs are probabilistically independent of previous ones. Lower values
of d and e correspond to higher degrees of correlation between old and new beliefs.
Any level of (positive) correlation can be generated within this model (although we
exclude the trivial case of perfect correlation that occurs when d or e is zero from the
analysis). We do not consider anti-correlation.
What are the detectives’ payoffs, i.e., the probabilities of ending the game with a
true belief? When neither detective plays Suspend nothing is really changed, so
the payoffs are as in the original version of the peer disagreement game. The profiles
(Stay,Suspend) and (Suspend,Stay) are also unchanged: as long as there is
some probability of the detectives changing their mind when playing Suspend
(i.e., as long as d[ 0 and e[ 0), in these profiles the detectives eventually agree on
whichever opinion the detective playing Stay started with (with probability one).
For the three remaining profiles, determining the payoffs is a little more involved.
Here we rely on an analysis using (absorbing) Markov Chains. On any round, the
game may be in one of four states: Jane has a true belief and Hercule has a false
belief (state s1), Jane has a false belief and Hercule has a true belief (s2), Jane and
Hercule both have a true belief (s3), or Jane and Hercule both have false beliefs (s4).
20 Of course, only one of these two latter possibilities will result in a genuinely new belief: even in the
case where she generates a ‘‘new’’ belief there is some chance that this belief happens to be the same as
the one she had on the previous round.
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States s1 and s2 are transient, while state s3 and s4 are absorbing: the game ends
when an absorbing state is reached. The probabilities that the game is in one of these
states in the first round are given by the (row) vectors vd and va, where
Following standard practice for absorbing Markov Chains, we write the matrix of
transition probabilities P as a block matrix:
P ¼ Q R
O I
 
:
Here, Q is the matrix of transition probabilities between the transient states, R is the
matrix of transition probabilities from the transient states to the absorbing states, O
is the 2 2 zero matrix, and I is the 2 2 identity matrix (because there are no
transitions out of absorbing states).
If both detectives play Suspend, the transition probabilities from the transient
states are as follows:
For example, the transition probability from s1 to s2 is the probability that Jane
moves from a true to a false belief, which is dð1 pÞ, times the probability that
Hercule moves from a false to a true belief, which is eq.
Now the probabilities of ending the game in each of the absorbing states s3 and s4
are given in a row vector w, where
w ¼ vd
X
1
k¼0
Qk
 !
Rþ va ¼ vd I  Qð Þ1Rþ va:
The first entry of w is the probability of ending the game in the absorbing state
where both detectives have a true belief, and the second entry is the probability of
both detectives ending up with a false belief.21 Hence the (expected) payoff to Jane
and Hercule on the profile (Suspend,Suspend) is
w1 ¼
pq deþ d2ð1 eÞð1 pÞ þ ð1 dÞe2ð1 qÞ 
de pqþ ð1 pÞð1 qÞð Þ þ d2ð1 eÞpð1 pÞ þ ð1 dÞe2qð1 qÞ : ð1Þ
21 When at least one detective plays Suspend and d[ 0 and e[ 0, the detectives eventually end up
agreeing with probability one. As a result, the two entries of w sum to one.
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We can perform the same analysis for the profile (Suspend,Switch). The only
difference is in the matrices of transition probabilities Q and R. When Hercule plays
Switch, he switches back and forth between a true and a false belief on any round
in which the game remains in a transient state (once the detectives agree—i.e., an
absorbing state is reached—he stops switching). Hence
Using the same formula for w, we find that the payoff to Jane and Hercule on the
profile (Suspend,Switch) is
w1 ¼ p 1þ dð1 pÞð2q dq 1Þ
1 dpð1 pÞ : ð2Þ
By symmetry, the payoff on the profile (Switch,Suspend) is
q
1þ eð2p ep 1Þð1 qÞ
1 eqð1 qÞ : ð3Þ
Hence the full table of expected utilities is as given in Table 2. Note that if d ¼
e ¼ 1 we are back in the case we started with, where new beliefs are generated
independently of those generated in previous rounds. The above derivation thus also
serves as a proof of the values given in Table 1.
Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of this generalized version of the peer disagreement
game? This depends on the values of p and q (as before) but also on the values of d
and e. Suppose, for instance, that d ¼ e ¼ 1=4, i.e., in case the two detectives
disagree and one of them plays Suspend, she copies her reasoning from the
previous round three quarters of the time, generating a new belief in accordance
with her truth-sensitivity only one quarter of the time. The Nash equilibria of this
game are as shown in Fig. 2.
The results are qualitatively quite similar to those in the original peer
disagreement game. In particular, (Stay,Stay) is an equilibrium if and only if
p ¼ q, and (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium in the top-right corner of the
figure. The case where (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are equilibria
Table 2 Expected utilities in the peer disagreement game with correlated beliefs
Stay Suspend Switch
Stay (p, q) p p
Suspend q (1) (2)
Switch q (3) pq
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simultaneously occurs whenever p ¼ q 0:57. Figure 2 only shows the case where
d ¼ e ¼ 1=4, but to a large extent these features generalize to all possible values of
d and e, as the following propositions show.
Proposition 1 In the peer disagreement game with correlated beliefs, (Stay,
Stay) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if p ¼ q.
Proposition 2 In the peer disagreement game with correlated beliefs, if p ¼
q 0:63 and d ¼ e then (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash equilibrium.
Recall from Fig. 1 that at least one of (Suspend,Suspend), (Sus-
pend,Switch), and (Switch,Suspend) was a Nash equilibrium if and only if
pþ q 1. Arguably, all three of these profiles reflect a version of the Conciliatory
View (after all, they call on both detectives to revise their view in light of the
disagreement). While the region where (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium is
quite sensitive to variations in the values of d and e, this is only due to competition
from these other two ‘‘Conciliatory’’ profiles. The region where at least one of these
three Conciliatory profiles is a Nash equilibrium turns out to be robust to the
introduction of correlated beliefs.
Proposition 3 In the peer disagreement game with correlated belief, if pþ q 1
then at least one of the Conciliatory profiles is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In the peer disagreement game with correlated belief, if p ¼
q[ 1=2 then both detectives have a higher probability of ending the game with a
true belief under any of the three Conciliatory profiles than under (Stay,Stay).
(Su,Sw)
 & (Sw,Su)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Stay)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Suspend)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Suspend,Switch)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Stay,Switch)
(Stay,Stay)
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
(Su,Sw)
(Sw,Su)
(Suspend,Suspend)
Fig. 2 Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game with correlated belief (d ¼ e ¼ 1=4) as a function
of p and q
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So in the game with correlated beliefs we can reproduce all the important features
of the game in the main text: (1) (Stay,Stay) is only an equilibrium if p ¼ q, (2)
Conciliatory and Steadfast profiles can be Nash equilibria simultaneously, (3)
Conciliatory equilibria are more robust to uncertainty about truth-sensitivity, (4)
when there are both Conciliatory and Steadfast equilibria, Conciliatory equilibria
are preferable by the detectives’ own lights.
We conclude that introducing correlations between the detectives’ beliefs on
different rounds does not have a strong influence on the results. In particular, all of
the qualitative conclusions we drew about the peer disagreement game in Sect. 5
remain valid when such correlations are introduced.
Appendix 2: A Model With Only One Round
The Model
Another potentially problematic assumption of our model is its iterative nature. In
particular, objections have been raised against the assumption that the strategy
Suspend involves, among other things, gathering new evidence (reflected by a
new independent draw from the probability distribution by which initial beliefs were
generated). This may be thought of as being against the spirit of the peer
disagreement debate.
In this appendix we will consider two versions of the model that respectively
weaken and completely remove that assumption. The first model moves from an
iterative model to a model with only one round, but keeps the assumption that if the
detectives Suspend on that one round, they gather new evidence to form their final
belief. The second model also has only one round, but now the gathering of new
evidence is removed in favor of the possibility of ending the game in a suspended
state.
How are the probabilities of ending the game with a true belief affected by
changing the model to have only one round? Details are given in Table 3. Since in a
one round game only the detective’s own strategy matters, this table just gives Jane
and Hercule’s payoff as a function of their own strategy.
The probabilities in Table 3 are obtained as follows. If the detective plays Stay,
the probability of ending the game with a true belief is the probability of generating
a true belief at the start of the first round (p for Jane, q for Hercule). If the detective
plays Switch, at the end of the first round she always has the belief the other
detective started with, so the probability of ending the game with a true belief is the
probability that the other detective got it right initially (q for Jane, p for Hercule). If
Table 3 Expected utilities associated with each strategy if there is only one round
Stay Suspend Switch
Jane p pqþ pðpð1 qÞ þ ð1 pÞqÞ q
Hercule q pqþ qðpð1 qÞ þ ð1 pÞqÞ p
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the detective plays Suspend, there are two ways to end the game with a true belief.
Either they immediately agree on the correct truth-value (this happens with
probability pq) or they disagree (probability pð1 qÞ þ ð1 pÞq) but the detective
suspends and the new belief she generates is correct.
Now consider a model in which, as above, there is only one round of the game,
but if a detective suspends she does not generate a new belief. The question is how
ending the game in a state of suspension should be evaluated. We introduce a new
parameter us to capture this value. It seems clear that being in suspension is worse
than having a true belief but better than having a false belief, which implies that
0\us\1. The most reasonable value of us is perhaps 1 / 2 but we will not assume
this.
Payoffs to the two detectives are given in Table 4. The only change compared to
Table 3 is that if a detective plays Suspend and the detectives disagree (with
probability pð1 qÞ þ ð1 pÞq) she gets a payoff of us (the value of ending the
game in suspension) rather than p or q (the probability that she would obtain a true
belief if allowed to gather new evidence).
Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of the version of the peer disagreement game with only
one round whose payoffs are given in Table 3, i.e., the version in which the
detectives gather new evidence if they suspend judgment (so the value of
suspending is irrelevant)? As before, it depends on the values of p and q, as shown
in Fig. 3.
The results are similar to those obtained before. The two main differences are
that (1) Suspend is no longer a good strategy outside of the top-right corner and
that (2) the profile (Stay,Stay) no longer appears as a Nash equilibrium in the
top-right corner, even when p ¼ q.
Particularly noteworthy is that (Suspend,Suspend) remains a Nash equilib-
rium in the situations most directly relevant to the peer disagreement debate: when
p and q are both greater than one-half and relatively close to each other. Hence we
take our results here to favor the Conciliatory View slightly more than the results
obtained in the main text.
What if no new evidence is gathered, i.e., payoffs are as in Table 4? Then the
Nash equilibria of the game depend on the value us of being in a state of suspension,
in addition to the values of p and q. This is illustrated for a number of values of us in
Fig. 4.
If us\1=2, it is never a good idea to suspend judgment: at least one of the
alternative strategies Stay and Switch always leads to a better payoff. If
Table 4 Expected utilities associated with each strategy if no new evidence is gathered
Stay Suspend Switch
Jane p pqþ usðpð1 qÞ þ ð1 pÞqÞ q
Hercule q pqþ usðpð1 qÞ þ ð1 pÞqÞ p
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(Suspend,Suspend)
(Switch,Suspend)
(Suspend,Switch)
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Switch)
0
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Fig. 3 Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game with only one round
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Switch)
0 1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
(Suspend,Suspend)
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Switch)
0 1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
(Suspend,Suspend)
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Switch)
0 1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
(Stay,Switch)
(Switch,Stay)
(Suspend,Suspend)
0 1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Fig. 4 Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game when us 12 (top-left), when us ¼ 58 (top-right),
when us ¼ 34 (bottom-left), and when us ¼ 78 (bottom-right)
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us ¼ 1=2, the three strategies Stay, Suspend, and Switch pay off equally well
whenever p ¼ q, so in that case any of the nine strategy profiles, including
(Suspend,Suspend), is a Nash equilibrium on the line through the middle of
Fig. 4 (top-left). If us[ 1=2, Suspend is the unique best strategy whenever p and q
are relatively close to each other in value (where what it means to be ‘‘close’’ is
stricter when us is closer to 1 / 2 and looser when us is closer to 1). Accordingly, as
us increases, we see a growing area in the middle of the figures where
(Suspend,Suspend) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Unlike either the original iterative model or the version of the one round model
considered above, the area where (Suspend,Suspend) is an equilibrium is not
confined to the upper right corner of the graph.
How do these results relate to the peer disagreement debate? Regarding the first
one-round model, whereby the agents are allowed to re-examine the evidence, we
can see that the Steadfast strategy becomes less rewarding. The strategy Stay no
longer appears in the top-right corner of Fig. 3, which is the area that is interesting
for the debate about peer disagreement. This means that, when the detectives are
peers in that they have comparably good track-records, the Steadfast strategy Stay
is always outclassed by other strategies, most importantly by the Conciliatory profile
(Suspend,Suspend).
Next, consider the second one-round model, whereby the agents do not go back
to the evidence to form a new opinion. Again we look at the more interesting top-
right corners in Fig. 4. Somewhat unsurprisingly, we can see that which strategy is
best depends on the value that is assigned to suspension of judgment. The more
valuable this is considered to be, the more rewarding a Conciliatory strategy
becomes, and the less valuable suspending is, the more a Steadfast strategy comes
into play again.
References
Alchourro´n, C. E., Ga¨rdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet
contraction and revision functions. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2), 510–530.
Aumann, R. J. (1976). Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics, 4(6), 1236–1239.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural
change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), 992–1026.
Cevolani, G. (2014). Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement. Synthese, 191(11),
2383–2401.
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. The Philosophical Review,
116(2), 187–217.
Christensen, D. (2009). Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy. Philosophy
Compass, 4(5), 756–767.
DeGroot, M. H. (1974). Reaching a consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69((345)),
118–121.
Easwaran, K. (forthcoming). Dr. Truthlove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love Bayesian
probabilities. Nouˆs. doi:10.1111/nous.12099.
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Nouˆs, 41(3), 478–502.
Elkin, L. (2015). An epistemically modest response to disagreement, AGM-ified. The Reasoner, 9(9),
76–77.
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement 1367
123
Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In L. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers without Gods:
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life (pp. 194–214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method. London: New Left Books.
French, J. R. P. Jr. (1956). A formal theory of social power. Psychological Review, 63(3), 181–194.
Geanakoplos, J. D., & Polemarchakis, H. M. (1982). We can’t disagree forever. Journal of Economic
Theory, 28(1), 192–200.
Hartmann, S., & Sprenger, J. (2012). Judgment aggregation and the problem of tracking the truth.
Synthese, 187(1), 209–221.
Hartmann, S., Pigozzi, G., & Sprenger, J. (2010). Reliable methods of judgement aggregation. Journal of
Logic and Computation, 20(2), 603–617.
Jehle, D., & Fitelson, B. (2009). What is the ‘‘equal weight view’’? Episteme, 6(3), 280–293.
Joyce, J. M. (1998). A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65(4), 575–603.
Kelly, T. (2005). The epistemic significance of disagreement. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.),
Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 1, pp. 167–196). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher-order evidence. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.),
Disagreement (pp. 111–174). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1990). The division of cognitive labor. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(1), 5–22.
Lackey, J. (2008). What should we do when we disagree? In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford
Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 274–293). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2013). Disagreement and evidential attenuation. Nouˆs, 47(4), 767–794.
Lehrer, K., & Wagner, C. (1981). Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and
Mathematical Study. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Leitgeb, H. (2014). The stability theory of belief. Philosophical Review, 123(2), 131–171.
Levi, I. (1967). Gambling with truth. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lin, H., & Kelly, K. T. (2012). Propositional reasoning that tracks probabilistic reasoning. Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 41(6), 957–981.
List, C. (2013). Social choice theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/social-choice/
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2002). Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result. Economics and
Philosophy, 18, 89–110.
List, C., & Goodin, R. E. (2001). Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.
Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(3), 277–306.
Martini, C., Sprenger, J., & Colyvan, M. (2013). Resolving disagreement through mutual respect.
Erkenntnis, 78(4), 881–898.
Moss, S. (2011). Scoring rules and epistemic compromise. Mind, 120(480), 1053–1069.
Pettigrew, R. (2013). Epistemic utility and norms for credences. Philosophy Compass, 8(10), 897–908.
Romeijn, J.-W. (2015). Pooling, voting, and Bayesian updating. Unpublished manuscript.
van Inwagen, P. (2010). We’re right. they’re wrong. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement
(pp. 10–28). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, R. (2005). Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 445–459.
Zollman, K. J. S. (2010). The epistemic benefit of transient diversity. Erkenntnis, 72(1), 17–35.
1368 R. Heesen, P. van der Kolk
123
